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JOHNSONIAN FIGURES
Copia and Lockean Observation in
Samuel Johnson’s Critical Writings
Mark Pedretra

[EDITOR'S NOTE: 1650-1850 will revive old as well
as pioneer new scholarly traditions. One longabandoned tradition is that of the serial publication
of extended inquiries into large or complex topics.
With his "Johnsonian Figures," Mark Pedreira
opens a two-part senes on eighteenth-century
rhetoric. The second of his two essays will appear
in our next volume.]

Ye know not, what hurt ye do to learning, that care not for
wordes, but for matter, and so make a devorse betwixt the
tong and the hart.
-----Roger Ascham, The Scholemaster

In a 1777 entry in his Life ofJohnson, Boswell records a letter
written to him by Lord Monboddo in which the Scottish
philosopher criticizes Johnson’s copious style in Journey to the
Western Islands of Scotland. Monboddo, says Boswell, “disap
proved of the richness of Johnson's language, and of his
frequent use of metaphorical expressions" Boswell, com
municating Monboddo’s criticism to Johnson, records John
son’s lengthy retort, a part of which elucidates Johnson’s view
of figurative language: “And, Sir, as to metaphorical expres157
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sion, that is a great excellence in style, when it is used with
propriety, for it gives you two ideas for one;—conveys the
meaning more luminously, and generally with a perception of
delight."1
What is particularly interesting about this exchange is that
Johnson's response reveals the epistemic defense of figurative
language by an alleged Lockean thinker. As any student of the
period knows, Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding
severely criticizes figurative language as a "perfect cheat,”
language which is at best an accommodation, at worst an
abuse, and never—as Johnson’s comments on metaphor
suggest—epistemically illuminating. Scholarship on Johnson
during the past two aecades has detailed his alleged LocKeanism
in respect to both his model of cognition and communication,
arguing that Locke is the major epistemological source of
Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language, literary criticism,
and moral essays.2 That Johnson accepts at least the rudiments
of Locke's observation-based epistemology of ideas as found in
An Essay concerning Human Understanding (1690) and in Of
the Conduct of the Understanding (1706) is indisputable. In the
first edition of his two-volume A Dictionary of the English

1 Ed. George Birkbeck Hill, rev L F. Powell, Boswell's Life of Johnson, 6 vols.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914), 173-4.
2 The following scholars have explored Locke’s influence on Johnson's writings,
some with reservations about Johnson's acceptance of Locke's ideas. On Locke's
epistemology and the Dictionary see W K Wimsan, Philosophic Words. A Study
of Style and Meaning in the Rambler and Dictionary of Samuel Johnson (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1948), passim, James McLaveny, “From Definition to
Explanation Locke's Influence on Johnson's Dictionary," Journal of the History
of Ideas 47 (1986): 177-94; Elizabeth Heddnck, "Locke's Theory of Language and
Johnson's Dictionary,' Eighteenth Century Studies 20 (Summer 1987): 422-44;
Robert DeMaria, Jr , Johnson's Dictionary and the Language of Learning (Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1986), passim, on Locke's
epistemology and Johnson's literary criticism see Jean H Hagstrum, "Experience
and Reason," in Samuel Johnson's Literary Criticism (Chicago The University of
Chicago Press, 1967), J—20, John H. Middendorf, “Ideas vs Words Johnson,
Locke, and the Edition of Shakespeare," in English Writers of the Eighteenth
Century, ed. John H. Middendorf (New York Columbia University Press, 1971),
259-72;
William Edinger, Samuel Johnson and Poetic Style (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1977), passim, Cyril H. Knoblauch, "Samuel
Johnson and the Composing Process." Eighteenth Century Studies 13 [1980):
243-62, and on Locke's epistemology and Johnson's moral essays see Robert
Voitle, Samuel Johnson the Moralist (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961),
passim, Paul Alkon, in "Locke and Johnson," in Samuel Johnson and Moral
Discipline (Chicago- Northwestern University Pres, 1967), 85-108, Steven Lynn.
"Johnson's Rambler and Eighteenth-Century Rhetoric," Eighteenth Century Studies
19 (1986) 461-79.
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Language (1755),3 Johnson anthologizes large portions of
Locke’s epistemological (as well as educational) writings,
including, according to Lewis Freed’s landmark study of the
Dictionary, no less than 1,674 Lockean quotations in the first
folio volume alone." My own study of his Dictionary, which
turned up 97 rhetorical and 167 logical/epistemological terms,
shows that Johnson’s definitions and illustrations (i. e., illustrat
ive quotations) of cognitive terms are overwhelmingly Lockean:
some terms—rejlection, to abstract [ideas], to connect [ideas],
relative [relation of ideas], to deduce, knowledge, probability,
certainty, and memory—having usages with Locke as the only
illustrator? At the level of how humans think, Locke’s
epistemological model of cognition is un questionably the
primary Johnsonian model.
But the place of the Lockean model of communication in
Johnson’s writings, especially concerning style, is more trouble
some, as an analysis of his critical statements about the art of
rhetoric, as well as some brief excursions into the rhetorical
record of his Dictionary will show. Johnson by and large
concurred with Locke’s model of cognition, but saw disabling
limitations—communicative and ethical—in Locke’s model of
communication. At issue in Johnson’s and Locke’s divergent
communication models, I contend, are their radically different
stances on the value of stylistic copia. Simply put, for Locke,
stylistic copia, with its resources of figurative abundance,
variety, and suasion, is the very anti-model of his observation
based semiotic that strictly limits the acquisition and com
munication of “truth and knowledge” within the logos-centered
parameters of correspondence and convention; whereas for
Johnson, these same copious stylistic ideals, amplificatory and
suasive, aid observation and reflection, thereby advancing
knowledge and truth. To argue my thesis, I will compare

3 The first edition of A Dictionary of the English Language was published in 1755;
subsequent editions of this two folio volume dictionary, revised by Johnson, were
published in 1756, 1765, and 1773.
4Lewis M. Freed, “The Sources of Johnson's Dictionary" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell
University, 1939), 45.
s I base these figures on a data base compiled from my reading of Johnson’s 1755
edition of his Dictionary (A Dictionary of the English Language, 2 vols. [London:
W. Strahan, 1755; New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1967]). These totals count each
rhetorical and epistemological/logical term only once, not including each
grammatical variant of a term. This data base informs my in-progress doctoral
dissertation, entitled “Samuel Johnson’s Rhetorical Art: Topical and Figurative
Copia in the Age of Locke."
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Locke’s and Johnson’s respective positions on the copia
tradition, a comparison placed against an historical definition
of the copia tradition as Locke and Johnson would probably
have understood it.
I begin with an extended historical definition of the copia
tradition, emphasizing the tradition’s Ciceronian and neoCiceronian contours against which seventeenth and eighteenth
century theories of communication are generally measured. In
the Roman rhetorics of Cicero and Quintilian, copia is defined
as an “abundance” and "variety” of subject matter and
words—in Quintilian’s words in the tenth book of Institutio
Oratoria, “eae constant copia rerum ae verborum,” that is, “a
copious supply of words and matter.”6 This copious supply of
words ana matter are the rhetor’s persuasive resources: in
respect to words, the innumerable variety of tropes and figures
outlined in the Roman rhetorics’ canon of elocutio, and, in
respect to subject matter, the many lines of argument (i. e.,
topoi} first given systematic definition by Aristotle and later
adopted by the Roman rhetoricians in their canon of inventio.
Because my argument is concerned the status of stylistic copia
in Johnson’s critical writings, I shall limit my discussion to
copia of words, as defined in the figurative tradition of rhetor
ic’s canon of elocutio.
Students of the Roman rhetorics were advised by Quintilian,
disciple of Ciceronian rhetoric, to pursue copia of style either
by turning to his books on style, Books VIII and IX of the
Institutio, in which the figures (henceforward denoting both
tropes and figures) are defined, classified, and exemplified, or to
the best models of eloquence. Though the models varied some
what from the classical period to the eighteenth century,
Cicero, Isocrates, and, of course, Quintilian himself, were
generally upheld as the primary models of rhetorical copious
ness; and Homer, Pindar, Virgil, Ovid, and Horace modeled
poetic copiousness. The common chord for all these copious
speakers and writers is the belief that stylistic abundance and
variety, particularly of the figures, potentially better enables a
writer to pursue his craft and to move an audience. It is not
surprising, therefore, that from the classical definition of copia
in the Roman rhetorics to the modern definition in Hugh

6 Quintilian, The Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian, trans. H. E. Butler, 4 vols.,
Loeb Classical Library #127 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1921), IV:
4-5.
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Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, the place of
stylistic copia in the traditions of handbooks and exemplary
models (imitatio) has been presented as a wedded knot.
Proposals for the divorce of these traditions, that argued for
the severance of the stylistic handbook tradition from composi
tion models, would await the revisionary epistemologies of the
late seventeenth century, of which Locke was the major voice.
Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers like Locke and
Johnson, in their reflections on the copia tradition, not only
had the classical tradition to consider but also the broadening
influence of the Renaissance rhetorical tradition. Erasmus
fathered the Renaissance's educational interest in stylistic copia
in his copious textbook on varying and amplifying words and
subject matter written for St. Paul's School, De Utraque
Verhorum ac Rerum Copia (1512), the title borrowed from
Quintilian's famous passage on copia ("eae constant copia rerum
ae verborum”) in the tenth book of Institutio Oratoria.7 Like
Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria, Erasmus's De Copia provides
the student with an abundance of figures to vary and amplify
the language; but as an educational manual which discusses
only the Ciceronian canons of invention and style (not the full
canon of inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and pronuntialio), Erasmus's educational manual is able to define and
exemplify each figure in more detail, focusing on the multi
tudinous ways figures can vary and amplify the language. No
less than twenty chapters (many being pages long) are dedicated
to teaching a student how to gain sentence variety by using a
range of figures, followed by a recapitulative chapter, entitled
"Experientiae,” in which Erasmus models how a single sen
tence—"Tuae literae me magnopere delectarunt"—can be
copiously varied some 200 times through synonymy, periphra
sis, heterosis, synecdoche, metaphor, simile, metonymy,
metalepsis, enallage, hyperbole, relatio, contraries, and others.
Erasmus's influence on the stylistic fluency of Renaissance and
post-Renaissance students is incalculable. For over a century
nis educational handbook was a primary manual for Renais
sance "themes” (i. e., student exercises amplifying, via figures
and topoi, an idea) an educational exercise which continued
into the eighteenth century, as Latin themes by Johnson held

T W Baldwin, “The Rhetorical Training of Shakespeare: Erasmus, Copia'
William Shakeiptare’t Small Latine & Lene Grttkt (Urbana: University of Illinois

7

Press, 1944), 182.
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in the Bodleian testify.8 Though Erasmus’s influence had
waned somewhat by mid-seventeenth century, we know on
Boswell’s testimony that even in the eighteenth century
Erasmian copia was valued enough by humanistic educators like
Samuel Johnson to recommend Erasmus’s copious Colloquies (a
student reader) for secondary school Latin reading and com
position practice,9 and that, a student of rhetoric himself,
Johnson possessed (as his library sale catalogue records) the
1540 Basel edition of Erasmus’s complete works, a text which
opened with De Copia 10 Johnson’s own words, however, are
the best testimony to his love of Erasmian rhetorical human
ism, for in a short epideictic passage in Rambler #108 he praises
Erasmus as one who "will stand for ever in the first rank of
literary heroes.”11
In the English educational copia tradition, popular sixteenth
and seventeenth century handbooks of figures, like George
Puttenham’s The Arte ofEnglish Poesie (1589), Henry Peacham’s
The Garden of Eloquence (1577), and John Smith’s The Mysterie
of Rhetorique Unvail'd (1657), had record-breaking print
histories well into the eighteenth century, these texts being to
fluency and copia in English what Erasmus’ was for Latin.12
English handbooks on figurative language instructed students,

8 In the Oxford Authors edition of Samuel Johnson, there is an example of
Johnson’s amplification of a theme taken from Juvenal's Satires, “Quis enim
virtutem ampiectitur ipsam Praemia si tollas?" (Donald Greene, ed., Samuel
Johnson, The Oxford Authors [New York: Oxford University Press], 39).
9 In 1736, Johnson eave his cousin Rev. Samuel Ford a “Scheme for the Classes
of a Grammar School." under which the following citation is recorded: “Erasmus,
with an English translation, by [Mr. Clarke]" (Boswell's Life of Johnson, I: 99).
Johnson’s reference is to John Clarke’s 1720 edition of Erasmus’s Colloquies,
entitled Erasmi Colloquia Selecta: Or, The Select Colloquies of Erasmus. With an
English Translation, As literal as possible, design'd for the Use of Beginners in the
Latin Tongue.
10 In Johnson’s sale catalogue of books ar his death he possessed the following
edition of Erasmus’ collected works, cited as lot number “258"; Erasmi opera, 4t.
Bas. 1540 (The Sale Catalogue of Samuel Johnson). Of this edition, and others until
the Leiden edition of 1703, Virginia Callahan says that “pride of place was to be
given to [Erasmus ] De Copia Verborum ac Rerum" (Virginia W. Callahan, “The
De Copia-. The Bounteous Horn," Essays on The Works of Erasmus, ed. Richard L.
DeMolen [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978], 104).
11 W. J. Bate and Albrecht B. Strauss, eas.. The Rambler, The Yale Edition of the
Works of Samuel Johnson (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), IV: 214.
12 Smith’s Rhetorique was the primary source for Johnson’s illustration of figures.
One of the most popular handbooks in the mia-seventeenth century and early
eighteenth century, it went through nine editions from 1657 to 1706 (Howell,
Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700 [New York: Russell & Russell, Inc.,
1956], 276, 280).
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assisted English writers as diverse as the euphuistic John Lyly
and neo-classical Ben Jonson (who authored the copious
commonplace book Timber: or Discoveries), and even appeared,
as did Peacham’s and Smith’s, in excerpted illustrative quota
tions in Johnson’s Dictionary.13 In both its classical and
Renaissance definition, the domain of copia was the sphere of
learning—“copiose loquens sapientia,” as Cicero, and later
Renaissance humanists, defined it.14 To sever such a marriage
between eloquence and wisdom, says Roger Ascham’s The
Scholemaster— a work hailed by Johnson as “perhaps containing
the best advice that was ever given for the study of lan
guages”’1
5—would “make a devorse betwixt the tong and the
hart.”16
If copia was a leading rhetorical ideal of the Renaissance and
early seventeenth-century writers, the linguistic ideal of the
philosophers and scientists of the Royal Society, in contrast,
was an inquiry-based, expository ideal of language, modeled
upon the Baconian epistemology and the Newtonian philoso
phy of science. As a member of the Royal Society, whose
interests included science, philosophy, and politics, Locke
provided the Society with its major epistemological model.
Like Thomas Sprat, whose mid-century History of the Royal
Society is renowned for setting up the dialectical and rhetorical
arts as antithetical to scientific inquiry,17 Locke’s own writings
were equally renowned for positioning the neo-Aristotelian
logical and neo-Ciceronian rhetorical traditions of his day as
traditions inimical to his observation-based epistemology.
Regarding rhetoric, Locke’s epistemology specifically challenges
the canon of elocutio with revisionary stylistic proposals which
call for change in education, ethics, and politics. Since educa
tional, ethical, and political concerns converge in his critique of
the stylistic canon of rhetoric, I shall treat them not as discrete

13 See p. 31, note #50.
Cicero says. 'Nihil enun est aliud eloquentia nisi copiose loquens sapientia' (De
14
Part it tone Oratona, trans. H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library, #349 [Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1942], 368).
Samuel Johnson, Life of Roger Ascham, in The Works of Sarnuel Johnson, LL.D.,
15
ed. Arthur Murphy, 3d. ed., 2 vols. (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers.
1859), 384.
16 Roger Ascham, The Scholernaster, ed. John E.B. Mayor (1863; rpt. New York:
AMS Press. Inc., 1967), 137.
17 See Thomas Sprat, History of the Royal Society, eds. Jackson I. Cope and Harold
W. Jones, Washington University Studies (1667; rpt. Saint Louis: Washington
University Press, 1958), 6-10.

164

1650-1850

concerns but rather as intersecting radii of a civic-minded
model of communication—a critique that serious students of
Locke like Johnson could not ignore.
Locke’s model of communication is anything but copious.
In the Essay's chapter "Of the Abuse of Words’’ in Book III,
chapter X Locke says,

the ends of Language in our Discourse -with others, being
chiefly these three: First, To make known one Man’s
Thoughts or Ideas to another. Secondly, To do it with
as much ease and quickness, as is possible; and Thirdly,
Thereby to convey the Knowledge of Things. Language is
either abused, or deficient, when it fails in any of these
Three.’8
Most of Locke’s university-educated readers in this period
would probably have recognized that his three ends of language
reduces traditional rhetoric’s three doctrines of language—docere
(to instruct), movere (to move), and delectare (to delight)—to
the sole doctrine of docere. This resulting shift in philosophy
of communication is radical, moving from traditional rhetoric’s
emphasis on persuasion to the Lockean new science’s emphasis
on observation-based inquiry and an expository rhetoric. The
former depends on inventional heuristics and stylistic devices,
the latter merely on observation and reflection. Locke’s three
ends of language, that is, challenges rhetoric’s status as an art,
traditionally defined by its persuasive and technical character.
As a former tutor of rhetoric at Christ Church, Oxford,
Locke was undoubtedly aware that his proposed redefinition of
the three ends of language called into question the value of the
copious neo-Ciceronian inventional and stylistic canons.” In
fact, in his educational treatise published shortly after the Essay,
entitled Some Thoughts concerning Education (1693), Locke
specifically rejects methodical “systems," both rhetorical and
logical, as an unnatural method for learning clear reasoning and
clear expression, advising educators and students who insist on
" John Locke, An Essay concerning Hurnan Understanding, ed. Peter Nidditch
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), IH.x.23. I use the conventional citation format
of book, chapter, and section. Hereafter, citations will be parenthetical, referring
to this edition.
” Locke was elected Lecturer in Rhetoric (Praelector Rhetoncus) at Christ
Church on December 24, 1662 (Maurice Cranston, John Locke: a Biography [New
York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957], 73).
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such systems to find the “shortest systems possible.”20 In place
of these systems Locke’s Essay offers his “historical, plain
method,” a facultative method of advancing in knowledge and
communication, in which signs mature naturally (much, says
Locke, like light entering a virtuoso’s cabinet) through observa
tion, reflection, discursive reasoning, and unadorned speech
(I.i.3.). At the end of the Essay, Locke classifies his "historical,
plain method" under the branch of knowledge he calls "Doc
trine of Signs,” which he identifies with logic. British universi
ties during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in fact,
adopted his epistemological writings as logic texts.21
What is historically at issue in Locke’s failure to recognize
traditional rhetoric’s three doctrines of language is, in fact, the
"systematic” use of rhetoric’s copious canon of style in com
munication. At the end of Book III, chapter X, "Abuse of
Words,” Locke says,
But yet, if we would speak of Things as they are, we
must allow, that all the An of Rhetorick, besides Order
and Clearness, all the anificial and figurative application
of Words Eloquence hath invented, are for notning else
but to insinuate wrong Ideas, move the Passions, and
thereby mislead the Judgment; and so indeed are Perfect
cheat: And therefore however laudable or allowable
Oratory may render them in Harangues and popular
Addresses, tney are certainly, in all Discourses that
pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and
where Truth and Knowledge are concerned, cannot but
be thought a great fault, either of the Language or Person
that makes use of them. (III.x.34)

According to this passage good communication does not shift
the ground of discourse from inquiry-based logical appeals
delivered in an expository rhetoric (“order and clearness”) to
pathetic appeals based on suasive figurative language. For
Locke, the danger of figurative language and of the associated
doctrine of movere is twofold. Firstly, figures undermine the

20 John Locke, Some Thoughts concerning Education, eds. John W. and Jean S.
Yolton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 240.
21 See James G. Buickerood, “The Natural History of the Understanding: Locke
and the Rise of Facultative Logic in the Eighteenth Century," History and
Philosophy of Logic b (1985): 157-90.
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precise relationship between word and idea and between one
idea and another (issues of propriety and perspicuity that are
clearly stated in Locke’s three “ends of language”); and
secondly, figures move the emotions, insinuating falsehoods and
usurping the sovereignty of Judgment in matters of "truth and
knowledge” (judgment operating, in Lockean semiosis, in the
realm of an inferential logic of ideas). These dangers of
figurative copia, communicative and ethical, are best explained
and illustrated in Locke’s own definitions and examples of his
inferential logic of ideas.
According to Locke’s epistemology, all reasoning and
communication advances through an inferential logic of ideas,
a logic based on the analogy of mathematical reasoning.
Throughout his writings, Locke identifies logical reasoning
with mathematics. For instance, in Of the Conduct of the
Understanding Locke states that reasoning should follow the
analogy of a mathematical demonstration: "For in all sorts of
reasoning every single argument should be managed as a
mathematical demonstration; the connection and dependence
of ideas should be followed till the mind is brought to the
source on which it bottoms and observes the coherence all
along.”22 Identifying logical reasoning with mathematics is, of
course, an identification as old as the Socratic and Aristotelian
logics of ancient Greece, and as modern as the geometrical
method of Descartes and the Cartesian logics and rhetorics of
Antoine Arnauld and Bernard Lamy. Locke then had con
siderable historical precedent. The uniqueness of his own
mathematical/logical analogy was that it proposed to redefine
the scope and purpose of rhetoric and to broaden the concept
of demonstrative reasoning to new fields of inquiry, ethics and
politics, hitherto identified with rhetoric’s method of probable
knowledge.
Rhetoric’s role in Locke’s inferential logic of ideas is
nothing more than that stipulated in his Essay's “perfect cheat”
passage: “order and clearness," or in the language of the neoCiceronian canon, arrangement and style. The arrangement of
the Essay itself, in fact, indicates his lack of interest in tradi
tional rhetoric’s canon of invention, for he limits his discussion
of rhetoric to the Essay's third book, “Of Words," excluding

22 John Locke, Of the Conduct of the Understanding, ed. Francis W. Garforth,
Classics in Education, #31 (New York: Teacher’s College Press, 1966), 52. See
also Conduct, 49, 119; Essay, 643.
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the art's province from his second and fourth books on the
acquisition and progress of knowledge. Because Locke’s logic
of ideas offers a natural discovery, arrangement, memory, and
delivery of ideas, he defines the role of rhetoric as logic’s
helpmate, which assists logic's inferential reasoning with
appropriate word choice and with the clear connection of ideas;
in short, propriety and perspicuity. What is needed to achieve
propriety and perspicuity are good “habits"—the mainstay of
Lockean education—based on the imitation of good models.
Simply put, a writer or speaker achieves propriety in the use
of words, according to Some Thoughts concerning Education, by
following the models of the most clear, correct, and plainest
writers;23 and he or she achieves a perspicuous connection of
ideas, according to the Essay, by the “right use" of grammar’s
connective particles, in which “consists the clearness and beauty
of a good Stile."24 Such rhetorical concerns, in fact, are the
whole of Locke's definition of the art, a definition which is
best epitomized in his enumeration of rhetoric’s constituent
qualities: “Connexion, Propriety, and Order."25 Not surpris
ingly, in such a minimalist definition of rhetoric, imitation
takes the full stage and rhetoric’s copious inventional and
stylistic systems take a bow.
Though imitation of good models alone provides for a
sound rhetoric, Locke attempts to put his philosophy of style
on more philosophical grounds, extending the application of
his mathematical/logicai analogy of inferential reasoning to
include not only logical form but also style. In the section of
Of the Conduct of the Understanding entitled “Fallacies,” a
section largely about the ethical dangers of suasive “colours”
(that is, ornaments) in political rhetoric, Locke proposes that
writers adopt a "jejune and dry way of writing, by keeping to
the same terms precisely annexed to the same ideas, a sour and
blunt stiffness tolerable in mathematicians only, who force
their way and make truth prevail by irresistible demonstration”
(119). In Locke’s definition of an ideal style, mathematical

23 In a piece traditionally known as 'Some Thoughts concerning Reading and
Study for a Gentleman," anthologized in the Yolton edition of Thoughts, Locke
proposes that those who would learn propriety should “read such Books, as are
allow’d to be writ with the greatest Clearness and Propriety in the Language that
a man uses," and then suggests the Anglican divine John Tillotson as an exemplary
model (Thoughts, 320).
24 See Essay, (III vol 1-5.
25 Thoughts, 242.
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semiosis, the “precise annexation” (a geometrical metaphor) of
word to idea, replaces traditional rhetoric’s ideal of copia, an
abundance and variety of potential relationships between words
and ideas. Not surprisingly, therefore, neo-Ciceronian rhetor
ics like Thomas Farnaby’s popular Index. Rhetoncus, and neoCiceronian writers like Robert Filmer, whose notorious
Patriarcha Non Manarcha became the anti-model of Lockean
political ideology, receive Locke’s censure; Farnaby, for
leading educators to believe that figures "were the very Art and
Skill of Speaking well” and Filmer for misleading divine rights
advocates with "good words and a plausible style” (his copious
use of divine-rule monarchist metaphors).26 Ultimately, Locke
argues that stylistic copia in civic discourse threatens the
stability of truth, whicn according to Locke’s method, as I
argue below, should be based on his mathematical analogy.
If Locke’s vastly reduced role of rhetoric troubled rhetorical
humanists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the
implications of such a rhetoric for ethics was probably fore
most in their minds.
Traditional rhetoric identifies the
doctrine of movere (topical and figurative suasion) with ethical
discourse in which rhetorical copia enables a rhetor to persuade
more effectively through a variety of argumentative techniques
and language devices, many amplificatory in nature. While
Locke is also concerned with moving the will towards the
good, he states in the Essay's chapter “Of Power” that in
ethical decisions agents should only rely on logical inquiry,
examining laws and weighing potential pleasure against pain so
that action can be suspended until judgment holds court.37
This ethical calculus of the will provides a natural mechanism
for ethical reasoning. Ethical “truth” in Locke’s epistemology,
however, is not—as it generally is in traditional rhetoric—class
ified as probabilistic knowledge, but rather as a form of
mathematical-like “demonstrative knowledge.” In the Essay's
Book IV, chapter iii, Locke offers an ethical/political example
of demonstrative knowledge (one he probably borrowed from
Two Treatises, published in the same year as the Essay, 1690):

Where there is no Property, there is no Injustice, is a
Proposition as certain as any Demonstration in Euclid:

26 On Farnaby, see Thoughts, 242-, on Filmer, see Two Treatises of Government,
ed. Peter Laslett, 2nd ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 173.
27 See Essay, II.xxi.32-46.
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For the Idea of Property, being a right to any thing; and
the Idea to which the Name Injustice is given, being the
Invasion or Violation of that right; it is evident, that
these Ideas being thus established, and these Names
annexed to them, I can as certainly know this Proposi
tion to be true, as that a Triangle has three Angles equal
to two right ones. IV.iii.l=1
8)

Locke's claim here is based on his preceding discussion in Book
III of ethical "mixed modes,” complex ideas—like "injustice,”
“usurpation,” "tyranny” found in Two Treatises— wnich he
defines as “archetypes” of the mind (though possibly based on
observation or experience).28 To make a complicated matter
simple, Locke believes that ethics is demonstrative because
ethical mixed modes are human archetypes, defined by human
communities and if disagreed upon amenable to definition.
Regarding these ethical mixed modes, Locke makes no al
lowance for rhetoric’s range of topical discovery or figurative
amplification—a tradition largely comparative in nature; rather,
he says, “Definition is the only way, whereby the precise Meaning
of moral Words can be known; and yet a way, whereby their
Meaning may be known certainly, and without leaving any
room for any contest about it” (III.xi.17) Contest, of course,
is the pulsebeat of the epideictic, deliberative (political), and
forensic (legal) branches of classical rhetoric, which in Locke’s
day and in the eighteenth century became reclassified as the
English pulpit, senate, and bar. Needless to say, such a
“linguistic-mathematical” ethic—severed from rhetorical suasion
and agonistic debate—can only rise phoenix-like from the burnt
ashes of traditional rhetoric.
While Locke’s authority in the late eighteenth century can
be clearly seen in the work of the “New Rhetoricians,”
particularly Adam Smith and George Campbell,29 Locke’s status
among earlier writers like Johnson needs to be placed within
the broader context of eighteenth-century education and
politics. In respect to education, I limit my discussion to texts
that Johnson clearly knew. Having written the introduction
to “Rhetorick and Poetry” in Robert Dodsley's mid-century

28 See Eiiay, H.ix.b-7.
29 See Wilbur Samuel Howell, Eighteenth-Century Bntuh Logic and Rhetoric
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); James Engell, Forming the Critical
Mind: Dryden to Coleridge (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 194-219.
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The Preceptor (1748), Johnson was aware that Anthony Black
well's Introduction to the Classics, one of the anthologized texts,
argues for a "nervous rather than [a] copious" style, in spite of
the educator's respect for the figurative tradition '" An argu
ment perhaps motivated by the authority of Locke and the
Royal Society. Having quoted Thomas Baker's Reflections upon
Learning (1708) in the Dictionary, Johnson was also aware that
some influential educators adopted the Lockean line on
eloquence, in Baker's case, even borrowing Locke's pejorative
metaphors of the "perfect cheat”: “our common Eloquence is
usually a Cheat upon the Understanding, it deceives us with
Appearances instead of Things...Its strongest Proofs do often
consist in an Artificial Turn of Words, and Beautiful Expres
sions."31 Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Johnson's
revered Isaac Watts, a Lockean disciple in the Dissenter
tradition, responds similarly to both classical rhetoric and logic
in his school text, Logick (1726), tempering both within the
constraints of the Lockean epistemology. According to Watts,
rhetoric troves the passions and logic instructs, a Lockean
viewpoint, much as Locke's, relegating figurative language to
matters not concerned with “a Knowledge of naked Truth."32
Clearly, among three of the most prominent educational
writers in the early century, each respected by Johnson,
stylistic copia received a bad press.
Yet in spite of these anti-copious arguments by prominent
educators, it is more likely that Johnson's most serious concern
with the Lockean strictures of style issued from the gadfly of
republican writers whom he opposed in the fate-century
political pamphlet wars. The Lockean style, in fact, provided
a philosophy of style for a generation of republican political
writers—John Wilkes, Catherine Macaulay, Mary Wollstone
craft come to mind—who appealed to Locke's authority in

30 Anthony Blackwall, Introduction to the Classics: Containing, A Short Discourse
on Their Excellancies; and Directions how to Study them to Advantage: With an
Essay, on the Nature and Use of those Emphatical and Beautiful Figures which give
Strength and Ornament to Writing, 2d ed. (1719; reprint, New York: Garland
Publishing, Inc., 1971), 187.
31 Thomas Baker, Reflections upon Learning, wherein is shewn the Insufficiency
Thereof, it its several Particulars: In order to evince the Usefulness and Necessity of
Revelation, 4th ed. (London, 1708), 52.
32 Isaac Wans, Logick: Or, The Right Use of Reason in the Enquiry after Truth,
With a Variety of Rules to guard against Error, in the Affairs of Religion and Human
Life, as well as in the Sciences (1726; reprint, New York: Garland Press, 1980), bb.
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their identification of the political rhetoric of conservatives
such as Samuel Johnson,33 and the Edmund Burke of the
Reflections on the Revolution in France,34 as a copious, even
sublime, rhetoric masking self-interested power as political
principle. Johnson, particularly, raised the ire of republican
political pamphleteers who carried the banner of Lockean
political theory. His 1770s’ pamphlets, The False Alarm, The
Patriot, and Taxation No Tyranny—which opposed the repub
lican politics of the Wilkites and American Revolutionaries
with irony, copious topical argumentation, and stylistic
flourish—received the republican barb for their (as one writer
put it) “sublimity of...contempt.”35 Though such negative
evaluations are no doubt politically motivated, they do indicate
that Johnson’s contemporaries recognized, even debated about,
the copious signature of his political prose style. Given the
skepticism voiced towards stylistic copia in educational and
political contexts familiar to Johnson, the salient question is,
therefore, how does Johnson define and evaluate this rhetorical
tradition in his critical, as well as lexicographical, writings?
In stark contrast to Locke, Johnson takes seriously the study
of rhetoric, which he views as an intellectual and ethical
pursuit. As early as 1748, in his introduction to “Rhetoric and
Poetry” in Robert Dodsley’s educational anthology The
Preceptor, Johnson suggests that students who want to pursue
the art of rhetoric beyond Dodsley’s anthologized formulary
rhetoric, Anthony Blackwell’s Introduction to the Classics,
should consult Quintilian and the seventeenth-century Aris
totelian, Vossius. Besides Quintilian’s educational rhetoric and
Vossius’s modern rhetoric, we know that Johnson had a strong
interest in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, even to the point, as Boswell
points out in his Life ofJohnson, of proposing a much needed

33 In a pamphlet response to Johnson’s The False Alarm, Wilkes identifies Johnson
with the metonymic description “Orator of Polysyllables," accuses him of
“sponfingj in metaphor," and says of his prose. “A certain proruberancy of diction
may be very edifying to the maids of honour; and the inflation of your periods
cannot fail to find a passage into the quarter where the ERSE is said to have been
the reigning dialect" (A Letter to Samuel Johnson, L.L.D., in Johnsoniana IV, On the
False Alarm, &c. 1770-1771, A Garland Series [1770; rpt. New York: Garland
Publishing, Inc., 1975], 6, 7-8, 29).
34 See Mary Wollstonecraft, Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790; reprint,
Gainesville; Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, I960), 106.
35 Johnsoniana IV, On the False Alarm, 16.
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English translation of this work,36 which by the eighteenth
century had been Englished only twice (the noteworthy
translation being Thomas Hobbes’s 1637 edition).37 It is also
well known that Cicero was admired by Johnson, possibly as
much for philosophical writings—Johnson had also proposed
to translate English Tusculan Questions and De Natura Dear
u
m-as for his rhetorical writings.38 And as Johnson’s writings
and library sale catalogue indicate, he had probably read the
classical Isocrates, Demosthenes, and Pliny the Younger);39 had
definitely read the Renaissance rhetorical humanists Erasmus,
Ascham, Vida and Scahger (writings);40 and, surprisingly,
according to his library safe catalogue, had probably read—after
his 1775 tour of the Scottish Hebrides with Boswell, and
maybe even in the midst of composing his mature work, Lives
of the Poets (1779-81)—George Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric
(1776).41
Clearly, the serious study of rhetoric occupied
Johnson from at least his early Rambler/Dictionary period to
his mature Lives of the Poets.
Being an advocate of rhetorical studies and himself a life
long student, it is not surprising that Johnson said of rhetoric,
and her sister art poetry, "Rhetoric and Poetry supply Life
with its highest intellectual Pleasures; and in the hands of
Virtue are of great Use for the Impression of just Sentiments,
and Recommendation of illustrious Examples.”42 Johnson’s
statement about rhetoric and poetic—arts typically discussed

36 Boswell, in a entry dated November 1784, copies a list of proposals never taken
up by Johnson, which were given to Johnson’s friend Mr. Langton. One citation
reads, “Aristotle’s Rhetorick, a translation of it into English" {Life ofJohnson, IV:
381).
37 A. W. Pollard and G. R. Redgrave, A Short-Title Catalogue of Books Printed in
England, Scotland & Ireland, and of English hooks printed abroad, 1475-1640
(London: Bibliographical Society, 1926), 18.
38 Life of Johnson, IV: 381.
39 In the Sale Catalogue, lot 6 reads “Isocratis scripta"; lot 643 reads “Demosthenis
& Ӕschinis. Principium Graeciae Oratorum, opera, per H. Wolhum, Frankf.
1604"; and lot 206 reads “Caii Plinii secundi epistolae...Amst. 1734" (J. D.
Fleeman, ed., The Sale Catalogue of Samuel Johnson's Library: A Facsimile Edition,
ELS Monograph Series, #2 [British Columbia: English Literary Studies, University
of Victoria, 1975]).
40 The Yale edition of The Rambler notes scattered references to Erasmus, Vida,
and Scaliger in the index; Ascham, of course, was immortalized in Johnson’s 1763
Life of Ascham.
41 In the Sale Catalogue, lot 506 reads “Campbell's philosophy of rhetoric, 2 v.
1776, &c.”
42 Allen Hazen, ed., Samuel Johnson’s Prefaces & Dedications (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1937), 183.
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together until the Romantic period—displays his humanistic
principles. Rhetoric is addressed to the “intellect," defined in
Johnson's Dictionary as the understanding; and its ultimate
end, in keeping with the humanist tradition, is ethical: “the
Impression of just Sentiments." Given his belief that rhetoric
and poetic are intellectual arts with an ethical foundation, it is
not surprising that Johnson voices in Boswell's Life his unequi
vocal disagreement with Locke's plan of education, particularly
its divorce of knowledge from literary learning. In the Life,
Johnson says, “[Locke's ‘plan of education’] is very imperfect;
it gives too much to one side, and too little to the other; it
gives too little to literature."43 Johnson’s position on Locke
and communication, I contend, similarly claims that Locke
gives too little to rhetoric, and more specifically, too little to
style.
In the first edition of his Dictionary of the English Language
(1755), Johnson's definitions of the an of rhetoric stand in clear
disagreement with Locke, and even suggest Johnson's acute
historical sensitivity to Locke's proposed revisions for the art
of rhetoric.
Linder rhetorick, Johnson defines the an as
follows: “1. The act of speaking not merely with propriety,
but with art and elegance"; and "2. The power of persuasion;
oratory.” What is historically noteworthy about Johnson’s
first definition is its apparent disagreement with a rhetorical
trend of his time, beginning with Locke and the Royal Society,
that made propriety the cornerstone of the an of rhetoric.
Whereas propriety, for Locke, is—along with perspicuity—the
whole of the art, for Johnson it is “merely" a part; the whole
also includes “art," techne (inventional Heuristics), and “ele
gance” (rhetoric's stylistic canon). If the Dictionary's reader,
curious about Johnson's mention of propriety in his definition
of rhetorick, was to turn to propriety to see how Johnson
defines and illustrates the rhetorical usage of this term, he or
she would, interestingly enough, find Locke as the sole il
lustrator. “Common use, that is the rule of propriety, affords
some aid to settle the signification of language," reads the
Lockean Quotation from the Essay.44 Is it possible that Johnson
thought about Locke's strictures on rhetoric when he selected

43 Life afJohnson, HI: 358.
44 Qtd. from the Essay, III.ix.8., with minimal alteration The passage in the
Essay reads: “'Tis true, common Use, that is the Rule of Propriety, may be
supposed here to afford some aid, to settle the signification of Language."
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Locke as the sole representative of Propriety and then in the
space of two alphabet letters defined the term rhetorick as an
“elegant art,” not merely an art concerned with “propriety”?
Did he mean his definition, therefore, to be a corrective to
Locke’s anti-copious rhetoric?
While I recognize, given the highly derivative nature of
English lexicography, the possible pitfalls involved in inferring
authorial intentions from lexicographical data, I base my
following claims about the historical significance of Johnson’s
definitions and illustrations of rhetoric not only on the fact
that Johnson’s definitions are highly original (a mere 5 to 12%
of his definitions are borrowed from English and Latin lexicog
raphers45) but also on the following two historical facts. First,
Johnson’s definition of rhetorick is unique in the English
lexicographical tradition for its pointed response to an histor
ical exigency, specifically, to the reductive definition of rhetoric
by the preeminent philosopher of his era. In fact, other major
dictionaries from Robert Cawdrey’s Table Alphabeticall(1604)
to Nathan Bailey’s Dictionarium Britannicum (1730), had
essentially recorded, with minimal revisions and without
sensitivity to historical exigencies, the Ciceronian definition of
rhetoric as the art of “speaking well.”'4
6 And second, for his

45 In an article that examines Johnson's debt to Nathan Bailey's Dictionanum
Bntannicum, the principal English dictionary informing the Dictionary's
definitions, David McCracken's study of the letter “L" indicates that only 5% of
Johnson’s definitions “owe a recognizable debt to Bailey’s definitions." McCrack
en cites Daisuke Nagashima's earlier statistical study of the Dictionary's letter “C"
as a concurring viewpoint—though McCracken notes that Nagashima estimates
that Johnson’s indebtedness to Bailey may have been as high as 13% (David
McCracken, “The Drudgery of Defining: Johnson's Debt to Bailey’s Dictionanum
Bntannicum' Modern Philology 66 (May 1969): 340).
46 The following list includes definitions of rhetoric from English dictionaries
which De Win Starnes and Gertrude Noyes, pioneering scholars of English
lexicography, view as the pre-Johnsonian Englisn lexicographical tradition (De
Win T. Starnes and Gertrude E. Noyes, The English Dictionary from Cawdrey to
Johnson, 1604-1755 [Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1946].
My list begins with Thomas Thomas’s Latin/English dictionary because of its
well known influence on the English tradition (short titles are used; etymologies
are excluded): Thomas Thomas's Dictionanum Linguae Latinae et Anghcanae
(1587) defines rhetonca, “Tbe an and science to speak well and wisely, that is of
rhetorike, rhetoricke; Robert Cawdrey’s A Table Alphabeticall (1604) defines
rhetoncke, “an of eloquence”; Henry Cockeram’s The English Dictionary (1623)
defines rhetoriccke, “The An of eloquent speaking"; Thomas Blount’s Glossographia
(1656) defines rhetorick, “the An and Science of Eloquence, or of speaking well
and wisely...[what follows is Blount’s short explanation of the definition, citing
the authority and words of Isocrates]"; Elisha Coles’s An English Dictionary (1676)
defines rhetorick, “The An of speaking Eloquently, or well and wisely"; Edward
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illustration of the popular rhetorical term propriety, Johnson
had (as the Oxford English Dictionary suggests) innumerable
choices among English rhetoricians and writers, including
rhetorical sources frequently quoted in his Dictionary like
Ascham’s Scholemaster, which praised the “unspotted proprietie” of Caesar’s Commentaries.'47 Johnson rarely quotes one
authority for a well known term in the arts and sciences; his
selection of Locke as sole exemplar of the popular rhetorical
term propriety, therefore, highlights his identification of Locke
with this rhetorical element of style. A fuller view of John
son’s definitions of the art of rhetoric will reveal, at a descrip
tive level, that Johnson viewed stylistic copia as essential to the
art: a likely motive for his apparent corrective of Locke.
In his other grammatical variants of the term rhetoric,
Johnson emphasizes the figures and the closely identified
doctrine of movere. Linder rhetorical, Johnson records “Per
taining to rhetorick; oratorical; figurative”; under rhetorically,
“Like an orator; figuratively; with intent to move the
passions"; and under to move (the fifth usage), "To affect; to
touch pathetically; to stir passion." Clearly, the figures, and
the persuasive doctrine of movere
? with which they are as
sociated, the twin pillars of stylistic copia, are central to
Johnson’s definition of the art. Copiousness he defines as
“diffusion; exuberance of stile,” and selects a Drydenian
illustrative quotation which identifies stylistic copiousness with
Homer, the poet whom Johnson, in Boswell's words, venerated
as the “prince of poets."48 The quotation from Dryden reads,

Phillips's The New World of English Words (170b, bth cd.) defines rhetorick, “the
art of speaking well and eloquently, a Science that teaches to find out things most
proper to perswade"; John Kersey's Diclionanum Anglo Brttannicum: or, A
General English Dictionary (1715, 2a ed.) defines rhetorick, "the Art of speaking
well and eloquently”;
Nathan Bailey s An Universal Etymological English
Dictionary (1721) defines rhetorick, "the Art of Speaking well and eloquently”;
Ephraim Chambers's Cyclopaedia: or, An Universal Dictionary of Arts ana Sciences
(1741, Sth ed. (1728, 1st ed.Q])defines rhetorick, "the an of speaking copiously on
any subject, with all the advantages of beaury and force, [a long explanation
follows m which the authority of Francis Bacon and Gerhard Vossius supports
and expands upon this definition]”, and Nathan Bailey's Diclionanum Britan
nicum (1710)—tn deference to Chambers—redefines rhetorick, “the An of speaking
copiously on any subject, with all the Advantages of Beaury and Force.”
' See Scholemaster, 92-3, in the 1989 edition ol the OED, Ascham stands as the
first of many illustrations under propriety (Thr Oxford English Dictionary, prepared
by J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner. 2nd ed., 20 vols (Oxford. Clarendon
Press. 1989).
48 Life of Johnson, II: 129.
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“The Roman orator endeavoured to imitate the copiousness of
Homer, and the Latin poet made it his business to reach the
conciseness of Demosthenes.” Though one illustrative quota
tion does not make a panegyric for a tradition, if one weighs
the writers that Johnson favors in his own prose writings
composed during his Dictionary years by Dryden’s stylistic
balance, copia would prove the larger measure. In his Rambler
essays Johnson consistently favored copious poets and orators,
Homer and Cicero, as well as the more copious Latin poets
Ovid and Horace, to stand as epitaphs, exemplars of copia, in
The Rambler.49 The pronounced place of stylistic copiousness
in Johnson’s Dictionary definitions and illustrations equally
governed the stylistic touchstones of his contemporaneous
prose writings.
Not only did Johnson’s definitions emphasize stylistic copia,
but he also included a small miscellany of figures that he
illustrated with examples from copious orators, poets, and
prose writers which he found in John Smith’s Mysterie of
Rhetorique Unvail'd and Henry Peacham’s Garden of Eloquence,
as well as with a few illustrations of his own?50 The Diction
ary's examples of figures foreground ethical and religious
concerns, with the clear intent or moving his readers to virtue.
This is especially true of Johnson’s own illustration of figures
in the Dictionary. For example, under the amplificatory figure
epiploce—defined as “A figure of rhetorick, by which one
aggravation, or striking circumstance, is added in due gradation
to another”—Johnson appends an illustration that amplifies the
Christian theme of forgiving one’s enemies: “he not only spared
his enemies, hut continued them in employment; not only
continued, but advanced them." And under anadiplosis—defined
as “reduplication”—Johnson’s own illustrative example might

49 According to the appendices in Robert Olson’s study of Johnson’s classical
sources in his Rambler and Adventurer essays. Homer is quoted in 8 essays, Cicero
in 3, and Johnson's favorite copious writers, Horace and Ovid, are quoted 80 and
27 times respectively; except for Cicero, of whom Johnson oddly enough only
quoted once from a work he once proposed to translate, De Natura Deorum (in
Rambler 106}, the rest of these authors are the most frequently quoted in his
essays {The Classical Background of Samuel Johnson's "Rambler" and "Adventurer"
Essays [New York: University Press of America, 19841, Index B).
50 In my reading of the Dictionary, I found the following figures: allegory,
anadiplosis, anaphora, anastrophe, antanaclasis, anticlimax, antiphrasis, antithesis,
antonomasia, apagogical, aphorism, apophasis, apophthegm, apona, apostrophe,
asyndeton, catachresis, ellipsis, epiploce, epiphonema, hyperbole, metaphor,
metonymy, periphrasis, pleonasm, simile, and synecdoche.
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be viewed as an autobiographical testimony of his struggles as
a Grub Street writer, for it reads, “he retained his virtues amidst
all his misfortunes, misfortunes which only his virtue brought
upon him.” Johnson’s miscellany of figures, in short, reveal a
truth that he would return to throughout his writing career:
figures of speech provide a writer with a potential moral
economy for moving an audience to desire the good.
If Johnson’s Dictionary provides evidence of his clear
disagreement with the Lockean definition of the art of rhetoric,
then his criticism reveals what in particular he valued in these
traditions of rhetoric dismissed by Locke, especially concerning
audience psychology, ethics, and the art of writing. In one of
his earliest essays, Rambler
an allegorical essay on Criticism,
Johnson begins his essay by asserting that observation is aided,
not cheated as it is for Locke, by copious eloquence. He says,
The task of an author is, either to teach what is not
known, or to recommend known truths, by his manner
of adorning them; either to let new light in upon the
mind, and open new scenes to the prospect, or to vary
the dress and situation of common objects, so as to give
them fresh grace and more powerful attractions, to spread
such flowers over the regions through which the intellect
has already made its progress, as may tempt it to return,
and take a second view of things hastily passed over, or
negligently regarded. (III. 14-15)

Of these two tasks, the first is consistent with orthodox
Lockeanism, that is, communication should “let new light upon
[a reader’s] mind,” just as the communicator’s own mind needs
to be filled, like the virtuoso’s cabinet, with the light of
inquiry. But in his second task Johnson suggests, contra
Locke’s views on the province and purpose of rhetoric, that for
an author to “vary the dress and situation of common objects"
with “flowers" (the figures found in the florilegia of classical
and Renaissance handbooks) is to contribute to the perspicuity
of language by increasing an audience’s observation, known in
classical and neo-classical rhetorical parlance as attention.
Varying, of course, is the very heart of Erasmian copia of
words; and Johnson may even have had Erasmus’s following
statement about figurative variety increasing audience attentive
ness in mind when he wrote his third Rambler essay: “And
just as the eye is held more by a varying scene, in the same

I
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way the mind always eagerly examines whatever it sees as new."
51
[f it seems strange that a thinker whose model of cognition
is so firmly set on Lockean principles diverges so dramatically
from Locke in his philosophy of style, it must be remembered
that Johnson's psychology of figures has a clear precedent in
Renaissance audience psychology. Renaissance scholar Rosemond Tuve provides a neat distinction between the Renaissance
psychology of figures, with which Johnson identifies, and the
modern psychology represented by thinkers like Locke,
claiming that “modern usage has stressed the relation of
perspicuity to plainness," whereas Renaissance usage em
phasized the relation of figurative "illumination" to "splendor,
majesty, and with perspicuity, clarte, [and] chiarezza.”52 It is
perhaps telling that Johnson’s favorite modern rhetorician,
Gerhard Vosstus, upheld the Renaissance belief that figures
contributed to perspicuity, for Vossius begins his fourth book
of Rhetorices Contractae, Sive Partitionum Oratoriarum by
showing the complementariness of figures with perspicuity. Of
perspicuity and figurative style, Vossius says,
Nec satis est, ut dictio sit pura, & perspicua, quod
Elegantia praestat:
sed duobus praeterea opus est,
dignitate quadam verborum & sententiarum, ac felici
compositione.53

Nor is it enough, says Vossius, that the speech be pure and
clear, because Elegance predominates: but two more things are
necessary, a certain elevated manner of expressing words and
ideas, and a felicitous structure. Yet other moderns who wrote
in the age of Locke were constrained by his authority. True,
in his Logick, Isaac Watts does acknowledges the potential of
figures to present ideas with "vivacity,” yet nonetheless limits
figurative illumination to the domain of poets and orators, not
to those whose inquiries are for a "knowledge of naked

51 Desiderius Erasmus, On Copia of Words and Ideal, trans. Donald B. King and
H. David Rut (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1963), 16.
52 Rosemond Tuve, Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery: Renaissance Poetic and
Twentieth-Century Critics (Chicago: University ol Chicago Press, 1947), 30.
53 Gerardi Iohannis Vossi, Rhetorices Contractae Sive Partitionvm Oratoriarvm.
Libri V., University Microfilms Internationa) (Oxomae: H. Hall, 1655), p. 284,
V696.
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truth.”54 As the above Rambler passage suggests, Johnson’s
view on perspicuity is more closely allied with the Renaissance
position, and moderns of a classical bent like Vossius, than
with the modern stance of Locke and his disciples.
In addition to figures having an observational function,
Johnson mentions another epistemological role of figures not
recognized by Locke, namely, the assistance of memory. In
Rambler #175, Johnson asserts that aphoristic sententiae— which
his Dictionary more broadly classifies as “maxims,” “apoph
thegms” and “sentences”—have an inherently memorable form
that makes them beneficial to ethical inquiry. He says,

But, perhaps, the excellence of aphorisms consists not so
much in tne expression of some rare or abstruse senti
ment, as in the comprehension of some obvious and
useful truth in a few words. We frequently fall into
error and folly, not because the true principles of action
are not known, but because, for a time, they are not
remembered; and he may therefore be justly numbered
among the benefactors of mankind, who contracts great
rules of life into short sentences, that may he easily
impressed on the memory, and taught by frequent
recollection to recur habitually to the mind. (V. 160.)

In this passage the Rambler identifies ethical inquiry with the
faculty of memory because, as he explains in an earlier essay,
Rambler #41, without memory humans would lack “internal
motives of choice,” that is, the comparative judgments neces
sary to ethical inquiry (III. 223). Though Johnson’s writings
propose facultative means for improving memory (in the words
of The Idler, “the true art of memory is the art of attention”55),
he additionally believes that ethical inquiry is too important
not to assist the memory with whatever copious resources
language may provide.
For Johnson, part of an effective
rhetorical practice, therefore, includes using figures to store
human memory with sententious comparative standards, much
as Erasmus encouraged his students in De ratione studii to copy
out “pithy sayings such as aphorisms, proverbs, and maxims”

Watts, Logick* 66.
34
35 W. J. Bate, John M. Bullitt, and L F. Powell, eds., The Idler and The
Adventurer, The Yale Edition of the Works of Samuel Johnson, vol. 2 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), II 232

180

1650-1850

to aid the memory56 Isobel Grundy, in fact, calls Johnson the
"Man of Maxims"57: Rambler and Idler essays generally begin
with maxims; Rasselas is a veritable storehouse of aphoristic
wisdom; and even Johnson's political writings, especially the
famous 1770's political pamphlets, often open with a maxim or
proverb. And not surprisingly given his reading habits, for
according to Johnson's sale catalogue and Dictionary his library
was stocked with aphoristic learning: Erasmus’s Adagia and
Colloquies, Bacon's Apophthegmes and Essays (frequently quoted
in the Dictionary), Ben Jonson’s Timber, Pascal’s Pensees, and
John Ray's A Collection of English Proverbs, to give but a
partial list. It is perhaps a testimony to Johnson’s ethical and
rhetorical greatness that as a writer witn one of the greatest
memories in English literature he possibly displayed the
greatest concern for his audience’s mnemonic needs.
Johnson's appreciation of the ethical role of figures, how
ever, is not limited to sententious sayings.
Comparative
amplificatory copia undergirds Johnson’s conception of the
rhetoric of ethics. As I mentioned earlier, the titular topos of
Lockean ethical inquiry is definition, the definition of ethical
"mixed modes.” In his epistemology, Locke may stress the
facultative (i. e., natural) comparison of the "simple modes" of
pleasure and pain; and in works like Two Treatises he may
compare political ideologies with those of opponent Robert
Filmer. Yet Locke's comparative rhetoric ultimately centers on
definition, upon which there is no room for"contest.” Though
Johnson shares Locke's appreciation of definition, we have seen
in Rambler #41 and #175 that his ethics, in contrast, largely
rests on comparative judgments. And concerning political
ethics he even pointedly contradicts the Essay's claim of the
demonstrative nature or ethical/political reasoning, saying in
The False Alarm, “the perpetual subject of political disquisition
is not absolute, but comparative good.”58 While Johnson does
not unpack his assertion that deliberative rhetoric is compara
tive, such a divergence from the more linguistic/mathematical
Lockean viewpoint on political/ethical reasoning indicates a
56 See Erasmus, De ratione studii ac legends interpretandique auctores, in Collected
Works of Erasmus, ed Ctug R Thompson, vol 24 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 19781, 671.
57 See (sobel Grundy, ’Samuel Johnson. Man ol Maxims,’ in Samuel Johnson:
New Critical Essays, ed. (sobel Grundy (Totowa: Barnes & Noble Books, 1984).
58 Donald Greene, ed., Political Writings, The Yale Edition ol the Works of
Samuel Johnson (New Haven. Yale University Press, 1977), X; J27.
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corresponding divergence in their philosophies of rhetoric.
Because Johnson believes that ethical and political reasoning are
comparative—a "comparative good”—he values the traditional
rhetorical"systems' that are a means to the end of this good.
In classical and neo-classical rhetoric, ethical disputants,
whether in a political, legal, or demonstrative context, turn to
comparative amplificatory topoi and figures to argue their case.
Locke distrusts such an agonistic comparative rhetoric, a
rhetoric of “contest"; Johnson, on the other hand, recognizes
it as the kernal of ethical/political disquisition, and also seems,
as Bertrand Bronson's well known epithet “Johnson Agonistes”
aptly suggests, to enjoy such contest. Johnson’s own state
ments about the comparative character of ethical/political
argumentation, a theoretical position which implies the
methodological and ethical value of figurative and topical
rhetorical systems, deserve further scholarly inquiry.
I have now made my case for the positive epistemological
and ethical value of the copious figurative tradition in John
son’s critical thought, but I have yet to examine what for
Johnson might constitute an ideal (or true) copia in a prose
style. I frame my examination of Johnson’s critical statements
on copious eloquence by suggesting the compatibility of his
ideal with that articulated later in the century by Hugh Blair.
In a chapter entitled "Style—Perspicuity and Precision” found
in Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, Blair tells his students
that the ideal of eloquence is to "unite together Copiousness
and Precision," or in the broader context of the passage,
copiousness and all the species of perspicuity, which include
propriety, purity, and precision.59 In the same passage, Blair
warns that "too great a study of precision” will "retrench all
copiousness and ornament" and result in a “dry and barren
style.1' Johnson’s mature criticism, The Lives of the Poets,
published just a few years before Blair’s Lectures, seems to share
both Blair's ideal of "unit[ing] copiousness and precision” and
his concern about the "retrench[ment] of copiousness and
ornament" in the best writers of the eighteenth century. I
shall argue, in other words, that like the classically-minded
Blair, Johnson's upholds copia and perspicuity (though John-

59 Hugh Blur, Lectures on Rhettoric and Belles Lettres, ed. Harold F. Harding, 2
vol$. (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1965), 1: 203.
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son’s particular emphasis is copia. and propriety rather than
Blair’s"copia and precision") as the twin pillars or a good style.
Students of Johnson’s style can easily be misled about his
view of copia because in his critical statements he distinguishes
between what I call a false and true stylistic copia. Even the
Oxford English Dictionary (1989 edition)—though its one
illustration by Johnson on stylistic copia appears innocent
enough in its truncated form—borrows an example of false
copia from Johnson’s The Rambler #194: “This copiousness of
ideas, and felicity of language.”60 This phrase refers to the
fictional sophistic coffee-house wit, Eumathes, who “changed
his language with his dress, and instead of endeavouring at
purity or propriety, has no other care than to catch the
reigning phrase and current exclamation (V.250.).” Eumathes
is the fraternal twin of Johnson’s other invented copious wit,
Pertinax of Rambler #95, who represents the copiousness of
academic wits who, with great dialectical subtlety, argue either
side of an issue without any fidelity to truth.61 Both are
vicious wits whose copia neither unites copiousness with
wisdom, as it does in the Ciceronian/Erasmian model, nor
unites copia to purity and propriety. In matters concerning
abuse, whether in conversation, poetry, or prose, Johnson
could equal Locke in severely criticizing excessive copia.
Though a false copia, one divorced from knowledge,
wisdom, and propriety, is condemned, a true copia, coupled
with propriety and girded with learning, is praised by Johnson.
In his criticism, a true copia—one that matches learning with
stylistic abundance—is unequivocably one measurement of a
good style. Sometimes Johnson’s statements about copia are
quite explicit, as when he says of the sixteenth-century his
torian Richard Knolles (author of General Historie of the Turkes,
1603), “(t]here is nothing turgid in his dignity, nor superflous
in his copiousness.”62 But more generally, Johnson’s statements

60 It apptart in the OED under copiaumeu.
61 Pertinax says, “Among the zealots of liberty, I could harangue with great
capiauinru upon the advantages of absolute monarchy.* whereas “among the
assertors of regal authority. I never failed to declaim with republican warmth
upon the original charter of universal hbeny.' (my emphasis; Tht Rambler, IV,
146).
62 The Rambler, IV: 290. See also Idler «6J, “Progress of arts and language,'
which similarly states that stylistic copia should not be superflous (an elegance
labelled “affectation'), but. rather, proportioned to learning: “From the time of
Gower and Chaucer, the English writers has'e studied elegance, and advanced
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on copia are subtle, cast against the broader cloth of his literary
criticism and identified not only by the genus term copia but
also its species, abundance and variety. Such is the case in the
Lives of Joseph Addison, Jonathan Swift, Sir Thomas Browne,
and Herman Boerhaave, "lives” that clearly reveal the balance
of copia and propriety as the scale by which Johnson judges a
prose style. Addison and Swift represent the merits of rhet
oric’s middle and plain styles, styles, we shall see, that Johnson
admires when perfected by the likes of Addison and Swift yet
nonetheless does not hold in the highest regard. Boerhaave and
Browne, Latin and English stylists respectively, represent the
stylistic potential of the copious grand style (though their
writings display a range of prose styles), which Johnson
identifies with the beautiful though sometimes dangerous
"flights” of oratory. My comparisons of Johnson’s statements
about these writers are not meant to suggest that he believed
Boerhaave and Browne better writers than Addison and Swift,
for Johnson admired the latter as the finest writers of his day,
but rather that he saw certain important rhetorical qualities in
the copious styles of Boerhaave and Browne that in persuasive
discourse were not reached by Swift, and reached only in pan
by Addison.
Addison and Swift represent the merits of the middle and
plain style, respectively, in the Johnsonian canon. Johnson
praises these stylists for their clarity and precision, yet tempers
his praise because of his belief that they either displayed, as in
Addison’s case, a minimal copia, infrequently ambitious or
innovative, or in Swift’s case—barring his Tale of a Tub—an
absence of copia. Of Addison’s prose style, which Johnson
praises in his Life of Addison (1780) for its lucidity but not for
its energy, quotation and brief comment should suffice:

His prose is the model of the middle style; on grave
subjects not formal, on light occasions not groveling;
pure without scrupulosity, and exact without apparent
elaboration; always equable, and always easy, without
glowing words or pointed sentences. Addison never
deviates from his track to snatch a grace; he seeks no
ambitious ornaments, and tries no hazardous innovations.

their language, by successive improvements, to as much harmony as it can easily
receive, and as much copiousness as human knowledge has hitherto required" (my
emphasis; The Idler, II: 198).
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His page is always luminous, but never blazes in unex
pected splendour.61
While Addison's prose does not, in Johnson’s judgment, blaze
with ambitious ornaments (a judgment certainly consistent with
the well known self-avowed Lockeanism of Addison in his
Spectator essays), his writings do demonstrate what Johnson
describes as a copious “enchantment of fancy.” Of Addison’s
copious fancy, Johnson says, “Truth is shewn sometimes as the
phantom of a vision, sometimes appears half-veiled in an
allegory, sometimes attracts regard in the robes of fancy, and
sometimes steps forth in the confidence of reason. She wears
a thousand dresses, and in all is pleasing” (Lives, II.149). If
Johnson speaks of Addison's lack of a copious ornamental
style, he nonetheless appreciates at least one element of such a
style: a copious wit, in which Addison’s imagination takes
commonplaces of morals and manners, like "Truth,” and turns
them into the fecund variety of the Spectator's an. Johnson
characterizes Addison's middle style as "familiar but not coarse,
and elegant but not ostentatious," and for the student who
wishes for these praiseworthy graces of the middle style,
Johnson sends such a writer to Addison (Lives, II.150).
Of Swift, on the other hand, Johnson identified A Tale of a
Tub, one of Swift's earliest works, as the Dean’s sole exemplar
copiae. In his Life of Swift, Johnson says, "His Tale of a Tub
has little resemblance to his other pieces. It exhibits a vehe
mence and rapidity of mind, a copiousness of images, and
vivacity of diction such as he afterwards never possessed or
never exerted" (Lives, III.51). To unpack the significance of
this statement, it is helpful to contrast it with Johnson’s related
statement in the next paragraph about the general absence of
metaphorical copia in Swift's writings: “That he has in his
works no metaphor, as has been said, is not true; but his few
metaphors seem to be received by necessity rather than choice”
(Lives, III.51). Johnson identifies Swift’s use of metaphor, aside
from the copious genius displayed in A Tale of a Tub, as a
“necessary" use of metaphor, what his Dictionary’s "Preface”
would identify as the figurative use of words assimilated in a

61 Samuel Johnson, Lines of the English Poets, ed. George Birkbeck Hill, 3 vols
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905; rpt. New York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1967),
II: 149. Hereafter, references to this work will be parenthetical, with the short
title Lives.
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lexicon to ordinary usage. But it is the copious use of meta
phor, in particular, and of figures in general—deliberate stylistic
“choice" resulting in abundance and variety—that Johnson
identifies with the persuasiveness of rhetoric. “For purposes
merely didactick, when something is to be told that was not
known before, it [the Swiftian plain style] is the best mode, but
against that inattention by which known truths are suffered to
lie neglected it makes no provision; it instructs, but does not
persuade,” says Johnson {Lives, III.52). In terms of the two
rhetorical tasks of an author described in Rambler #3—“either
to teach what is not known or to recommend known truths
by his manner of adorning them”—Swift seems to fulfill only
the first task, the rhetorical doctrine of docere. Of movere and
delectare, the other two doctrines, Johnson leaves little room
for doubt: “[Swift] pays no court to the passions; he excites
neither surprise nor admiration” (Lives, III. 52).
It is, in fact, the expository role of the informed Dean in
The Drapier's Letters, the Drapier’s knowledge and ironic wit
put up against the specious and economy-threatening monetary
proposals of the notorious William Wood, that gains Swift the
accolades of informative and civic-minded patriot writer in the
Life of Swift—no small praise for a critic who had recently
authored The Patriot. Apparently, Swift's copious irony (the
one figure in Swift that Johnson never failed to appreciate) had
a good exchange value in the critic's critical ledger for the
Dean's so-called debit of other figures: a Drapier or Scriblerian
Bickerstaff, Swift’s brilliant ironic personae, perhaps equal in
Johnson's critical economy to a copia of figures. Johnson, no
doubt, recognized the inexhaustible potential of irony to
instruct by delighting—a figure as persuasive as it is memorable.
In contrast, Johnson's evaluations of Swift's non-ironic ex
pository writings, particularly his political writings, were less
generous when the Dean’s rhetorical success was limited, as
Johnson judged in The Conduct of the Allies, to “the mere
weight oi facts, with very little assistance from the hand that
produced them" {Lives, III.19). Indeed, Johnson, himself a
political pamphleteer of a more copious bent, conspicuously
minimizes the rhetorical skill of Swift's expository political
writings, attributing successes like the Examiner's heralded
Tory opposition to Addison’s Whig Examiner to Swift’s
advantage as adversary in “the choice of facts"—a performance
otherwise unequal, says Johnson, to Addison's persuasive
“wit" (Lives, III.16). Swift’s historical works, such as Change
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of the Ministers and Conduct of the Ministry, fared no better, for
Johnson dismissively notes in one sentence that Swift "filled his
tours with some historical attempts" (Lives, 111.27). Apparently, Swift's chronological narratives failed to delight and move
Johnson as did Knolles's copious stylistic graces in General
Historie of the Turkes, a work which made what was historically
remote, in place and time, more interesting to Johnson than
Swift's observations on the Tory England of Queen Anne. In
short, Johnson offers Swift as an exemplary model for pure and
precise expository English prose, a model for instruction rather
than persuasion, a model which in Johnson's critical economy
“deserves praise, though perhaps not the highest praise" (Lives,
III.52).
In contrast to Swift and Addison, Johnson's appreciates the
copiousness of Herman Boerhaave's and Sir Thomas Browne’s
style, an appreciation stemming from his conviction that
stylistic copia engages the attention of an audience, broadens
the horizons for writing, and advances learning. Johnson's Life
of Dr Herman Boerhaave provides evidence that young Sam
Johnson believed—in agreement with Boerhaave—that instruc
tion (docere) cannot, even in mathematics and the sciences, be
separated from pleasing an audience (delectare);, and that
eloquence is the heart of all learning, humanistic and scientific.
And Johnson's maturer Life of Sir Thomas Browne reveals that
he viewed figurative expressions as a contribution to the stock
of the English language and as an amplificatory means of
ethical persuasion.
Johnson's Life of Dr Herman Boerhaave (1739) contains the
reflections of a young biographical critic and poet—barely
recognized as an author but for his imitation of the "Third
Satire" of Juvenal, London (1738)—on how the renowned
scientist Boerhaave, member ot the Royal Society, demonstrates
the potential of eloquence to advance knowledge and unite all
branches of learning. Ten years out of Pembroke College,
Oxford, and, like any young writer who has not yet made his
mark, undoubtedly trying to justify his literary endeavours,
Johnson looks to the recently deceased Boerhaave, esteemed
scholar of physic, chemistry, mathematics, and languages
ancient and modern, as a model of learning and eloquence.
Admittedly, scholars must be wary of how they identify
Johnson with the Life of Dr Herman Boerhaave because the
Johnson scholarship has long recognized the derivative nature
of this "life" and others written in this pre-Ramblerian time
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period;64 nonetheless, many passages are characteristically
Johnsonian, both in style and theme. The quotation following
about Johnson's belief in the inseparability of pleasure and
instruction (delectare and docere) in successful communication
is such a passage, its style vintage Johnsonese and its theme a
thread from his 1750s' Rambler to his mature Lives of the Poets
(1779-81):
Nor was he unacquainted with the art of recommending
truth by elegance, and embellishing philosophy with
polite literature: he knew that but a small part of
mankind will sacrifice their pleasure to their improve
ment; and those authors who would find many readers
must endeavour to please while they instruct. He knew
the importance of his own writings to mankind; and lest
he might, by a roughness and barbarity of style, too
frequent among men of great learning, disappoint his
own intentions, and make his labours less useful, he did
not neglect the arts of eloquence and poetry. Thus was
his learning at once various and exact, profound and
agreeable.65
Eighteenth-century readers would, no doubt, recognize this
passage as a variation on the Horatian commonplace that
writing should both instruct and please. Yet this passage also
shows unusual sensitivity to the exigent arguments of Locke
and the Royal Society that scientific discourse should be
unadorned, plain speech. Boerhaave, whom Johnson notes was
an "elected Fellow of our Royal Society,” recognized the
rhetorical necessity of "recommending truth by elegance,” and
therefore "did not neglect the arts of eloquence [rhetoric] and
poetry.Johnson's interpretation of the consequences of
Boerhaave's rhetorical insight reveals an ideal oi eloquent
learning, purportedly Boerhaave’s and definitively Johnson’s,
remarkably similar to Hugh Blair’s own ideal of “uniting]
copiousness with precision." Because Boerhaave recognized

64 See Walter Jackson Bate, Samuel Johnion (New York
Harcoun Brace
Tovanovich, 1975], 218-20.
65 Samuel Johnson, The Life of Dr Hn-mjnn Boerhaave, in Samuel Johnion, ed.
Donald Greene, The Oxford Authors (New York Oxford University Press,
1984), 68.
66 Life of Boerhaave, 6J, 69.
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that knowledge and truth must be pleasing to an audience,
Johnson concludes, "his learning [was] at once various and
exact, profound and agreeable.67 By “various and exact"
Johnson means learning that eloquence copiously varies
without any cost to precision; by “profound and agreeable,"
learning that does not dissociate truth and eloquent expression.
No educational formula could be further from the Lockean
ideal of the language of learning being "mathematical and exact,
true and understood."
Johnson’s Life of Boerhaave highlights how Boerhaave,
scientist and mathematician, made his scholarly labours useful
to many by pronouncing constant orations on scientific
learning—orations epideictic in purpose and copious in style?68
For instance, in De honore medici, servitute, an end-of-the term
oration at the University of Leyden in 1731, Boerhaave, as
Johnson puts it, "[shows] the vanity of any attempt to rival the
work of God." In the following excerpt translated by Johnson,
the biographer delights in Boerhaave’s grand Latin style, his
English translation highlighting the Latin speaker’s anaphoric
repetition (magnified perhaps more than Boerhaave’s own
words support, as my footnote of the Latin suggests) in order
to persuade readers of the vanity of human learning which
attempts to compare itself with the natural created order of
God:
“Let all these heroes of science meet together," says
Boerhaave; “let them take bread and wine, the food that
forms the blood of man, and by assimilation contributes
to the growth of the body: let them try all their arts,
they shall not be able from these materials to produce a
single drop of blood." So much is the most common act
of nature beyond the utmost efforts of the most extended
science!69

67 Life af Haerbaavt, 69
68 Life af Baerboat*, 61
69 Life af Barrbaa ve, 65. The Latin, which Johnson translated from an earlier
biographer, Adben Scholtens, reads:
Mechajsici, Hydrostatic!. Hydraulic:, Physici, Anatomoci,
Chenuci, Mrdici, cooscribanrur!
Potenantnr hi giimilim conficere rons, quo insuccantur oculi, vel
□ariocum ambages’
Pal am ajo, no rum oihil coofore
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The emphasis of Johnson’s anaphoric translation attempts to
highlight Boerhaave’s humility of learning before God, in
contrast to the vanity of others in this age of tremendous
scientific advancement, the age of Locke, Newton, and Boyle.
In short, the value of this "life” in respect to Johnson’s
viewpoints on stylistic copia is its broad commentary on the
value of copious eloquence to the advancement of learning and
to the ethical and religious consequences of such an advance
ment. Johnson explores the merits as well as potential risks of
a copious English style in his Life of Sir Thomas Browne.
Though Sir Thomas Browne’s prose style is not upheld by
Johnson as a model worthy of imitation, as are tne more
perspicuous and correct prose styles of Addison and Swift,
Browne nonetheless receives Johnson’s highest praise for his
other rhetorical virtues. Johnson concedes that despite its
grandeur Browne’s prose style has faults, adopting the baroque
stylist’s own metaphor for human character—"To have great
excellences and great faults, magnae -virtutes, nec minora vitia,
is the poesy...of the best natures”—as a measure by which his
prose style should be judged?70 Within such an evaluative
framework, however, Browne’s great stylistic excellences more
than counterbalance his faults, excellences which even gain him
higher praise than the “equable tenor” of Swift’s style.
Johnson does charge Browne’s prose style with a tendency
towards obscurity and harshness, yet in spite of these faults he
defends him on the grounds of audience interest.
More
specifically, Browne’s argument and style sometimes lead the
reader into “collateral considerations” (i. e., his “plentitude of

En panem' en vinum'

Coacti in conciliabihum Sophi parent in de unicam particulam.
Frustra erunt &c. Quo fiat salutans gurta humoris, mynades variorum
canalium laborant. (see Richard Reynolds, “Johnson’s Life of Boerhaave
in Perspective" [Yearbook of English Studies, 5 (1975): 125-26 j)

While Boerhaave does make use of anaphora—“en panem! en vinum!’—the more
predominant figure is asyndeton, the omission of conjunctive particles, which in
the first sentence emphasizes in a congery-like effect the vanity of all scholarly
writings before the wonder of nature. Johnson probably chose anaphora as his
principal figure because it has a more dramatic effect than asyndeton.
70 Samuel Johnson, The Life of Str Thomas Browne, in Sir Thomas Browne’s
Christian Morals, ed. S.C. Roberts, 2d. ed. (1756; reprint, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1927), 47-8. Hereafter cited as Life of Browne.

190

1650-1850

ideas” and “images”), but, says Johnson, “the spirit and vigour
of his persuit always gives delight; and the reader follows him,
without reluctance, thro’ his mazes, in themselves flowery and
pleasing, and ending at the point originally in view.”'71 This
statement is perhaps one of the most telling in Johnson’s
critical canon, for in it he excuses what many in the eighteenth
century' considered the most inexcusable composition faults:
impropriety and obscurity of language. He excuses these faults,
quite simply, because Browne’s copious style achieves one of
rhetoric’s highest virtues for keeping the attention of an
audience: it delights (delectare). In clear disagreement with the
Lockean viewpoint that a “dry’ and jejune” way of writing best
guides a reader to knowledge, Johnson’s above passage makes
a clear case that instruction is, indeed, assisted by the flowers
of rhetoric.
To place Johnson’s delectare passage in a larger
context, one might compare his evaluation of Browne with
that of the metaphysical poets in the Life of Cowley, in which
Abraham Cowley and John Donne do not fare nearly as well
for their own “collateral considerations,” which are viewed by
Johnson as endless conceits that display more ingenuity than
truth and wisdom, and that therefore aggravate rather than
please. It would seem that in Johnson’s critical canon, stylistic
delight covers a multitude of sins.
Beyond keeping an audience’s attention, Johnson praises
Browne's stylistic copia for its potential to expand the English
language and to advance learning. In a well known passage in
the “life” of Browne, Johnson praises the writer’s ambitious
ornamentation (especially metaphor) for its copious expansion
of the English tongue. Browne, says Johnson,
has many “verba ardentia,” forcible expressions, which
he would never have found, but by venturing to the
utmost verge of propriety; and flights which would
never have been reached, but by one who had very little
fear of the shame of falling.72
There is something of Johnson the lexicographer in this
passage, penned shortly after the completion of the Dictionary.
In his “Preface” to the Dictionary, Johnson speaks of metaphor

71 Life of Browne, 47.
72 Life of Browne, 49.
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as constantly adding to the stock of language.73 It is probable
that Johnson's epideictic passage on Browne's "verba ardentia,”
his praise of the writer's invention of "forcible expressions,”
was born from his work collecting hundreds of Brownean
quotations in his Dictionary 74 many, indeed, Brownean
metaphorical flights. Some noteworthy examples are the
following (the term illustrated is italicized):
What roots old-age contracteth into errours, and how
such as are but acorns in our younger brows, grow oaks
in our older heads, and become inflexible.
He set out the felicity of his heaven, by the delights of
sense; slightly passing over the accomplishment of the
soul, and the beautitude of that pan which earth and
visibilities too weakly affect.

Unlike his frequent quotations from Addison and Swift, chosen
primarily for their clarity and correctness, Johnson mines
Browne's writings both lor his copious style and for the
virtuoso philosopner/scientist's illustration of many naturalistic
phenomena and technical terms. While it is not surprising that
the Rambler appreciates Browne's metaphorical copia, John
son’s evaluation adds the unusual qualification that the cost of
the copious expansion of the English language may bring with
it a risk to propriety, or as he eloquently puts it, “venturing to
the utmost verge of propriety.”75 It is in copious writers like
Browne that we see Johnson's lexicographical mind—a mind
forever in search of the new possibilities of lan
guage—informing his critical judgment.
If Johnson's lexicographical mind appreciated Browne’s
copious contributions to the English language, his rhetorical
concerns as a writer and critic led him to appreciate another
copious quality of Browne: amplificatory genius. Though
stylistic copia in general aids observation, rhetorical amplifica
tion, a species of figurative (and topical) copia, particularly has

73 In his “Preface" to his Dictionary, Johnson speaks maner of lardy about the
“hourly encroachments" of the tropological language of literature, which his own
illustrative quotations exemplify.
Lewis Freed counted 1070 quotations by Browne under the lener “A", 884 of
74
which were taken from Vulgar Errors (Sources of Joins on's Dictionary, 50).
75 Life of Browne, 49.
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the intended effect (in the words of Rosemond Tuve) of
"magnifying," "heightening," "intensifying," and, ultimately, of
making a subject more "significant” and therefore worthy of
"attention."76 In regard to style, either a single sensuous figure
or an accumulation of figures may bring about this effect; and
though the figures classified as amplificatory are as various as
the rhetoricians who classify them, these figures are predomi
nantly comparative and are frequently discussed in the context
of ethical discourse.
Johnson, significantly, recognizes
Browne's genius both as his power of rhetorical amplification
and his power of observation. This, of course, contrasts with
the unadorned observational genius advocated by Locke, and,
according to Johnson's critical interpretation, the similarly
unadorned "mere weight of facts” practiced in Swift's ex
pository rhetoric. Of rhetorical genius, says Johnson,

Some of the most pleasing performances have been
produced by learning and genius exercised upon subjects
of little importance. It seems to have been, in all ages,
the pride of wit, to shew how it could exalt the low, and
amplify the little.77
The identification of amplification with "the pride of wit” is
found both in classical and Renaissance rhetoric and poetic, a
display of the rhetor's or poet’s ability to take an image,
theme, or argument and make it more significant in the eyes of
an audience through figures or topoi. To "expand a scanty
theme," Johnson continues—no doubt thinking of his own
arduous bi-weekly Rambler essays written four years earlier—"is
a perpetual triumph of fancy." Such a rhetorical triumph is
accorded to Browne, whom Johnson identifies among the
amplificatory genius of other great writers, “the Frogs of
HOMER, the Gnat and the Bees of VIRGIL, and Butterfly of
SPENSER, the Shadow of WOWERUS, and the Quincunx of

Browne."78
The identification of Browne with the copious amplificatory
models of these great ethical writers has suggestive rhetorical
and ethical implications. Johnson, for instance, no doubt

76 Rosemoad Tuve, Elizabethan and Metaphysical Imagery. Renaissance Poetic and
Twentieth Century Critics (Chicago: The University ol Chicago Press, 194/). 90.
77 Life of Browne, 23.
78 Life of Browne, 23.
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recognized the ethical and persuasive import of Virgilian
amplification. In the Georgies Virgil invents a fable of bees to
magnify human customs and ethical mores in the Roman
pastoral world; many comparative topoi and comparative
figures (especially similes, metaphor, and personification) are
utilized to relate his observations of the laws of nature—kinship, governance, and husbandry—to the allegorical
world linking bees to humans. What Virgil's amplificatory
powers could do with bees, Johnson implies in the “life" of
Browne, so too could Browne's copious genius do with “little"
matters and themes, like the vanity of ancient burial customs
in Hydriotaphia, Urne-Burial, or, A Brief Discourse of the
Sepulchrall Limes Lately Found in Norfolk. I turn briefly to
Ume-Bunal rather than to the amplificatory wit of the quincunxial Garden of Cyrus—texts which have historically been
printed together79—because the former displays Browne's use of
figurative amplification, the latter his genius at topical amplifi
cation, which is beyond the scope of my argument.
In Urne-Burial, Browne, like Virgil, uses amplificatory
rhetoric to draw ethical reflections from his observations of the
physical world: the Norfolk urns he discovered in
A
few examples of figures—one commented upon by Johnson
himself—should illustrate what any reader of Browne, and
Johnson in particular, recognizes as the typical amplificatory
copiousness of Brownean rhetoric.
The arrangement of Browne's Ume-Burial narrative, interest
ingly enough, builds to a crescendo of amplification, much as
the six-part classical oration typically ended in an amplificatory
peroration. Browne's five-chapter narrative, in fact, moves
from a relatively unadorned narrative description of the urns
and their ancient lore in the first two chapters to his highly
evaluative, almost sermonic, reflections on tne vanity of human
burial customs in the subsequent chapters. In chapter 3, for
example, he uses similitudes both to describe the physical
features of the urns and to draw an emblem of their ontolog
ical significance (essentially, the adage from womb to tomb):
“But the common form with necks was a proper figure,

79 Geoffrey Keynes says, “Until comparatively recent times Hydriotaphia and The
Garden af Cyrus were not reprinted separately, having been properly recognized
as twin stars in the firmament of literature.* (GeoHrey Keynes, ed., The Works of
Sir Thomas Browne, 4 vols. (Chicago: The University oi Chicago Press, >964),
126.
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making our last bed like our first; nor much unlike the Urnes
of our Nativity, while we lay in the nether pan of the Earth,
and inward vault of our Microcosme.”80 What probably moved
Johnson as he read numerous similar examples of copiouslyfigured Brownean observations on burial customs is the writer’s
success—possibly inspired by contemporary divines who
traditionally spoke of death as an incentive to vinue—of
putting death constantly before the reader’s eyes. In the very
same chapter, Roman graves become, through metaphor,
“memento's of mortality unto living passengers."81 And early
Christian epitaphs, mentioned in the same paragraph, become,
through metonymy, “the sensible Rhetonck of the dead, to
exemplarity of good life." The contrast here between pagan
and Christian burial customs magnified through figures is, in
fact, a constant of Browne's rhetorical strategy in Ume Burial.
While Johnson credits Browne for his power of observa
tion—the “examinfation] of the substances found in his Norfolcian urns" and the scholarly "particulars he has amassed
together"82—it is not such antiquary data that he interprets as
the core of this work. Before quoting a passage from the
penultimate chapter on Christianity and ancient burial customs,
Johnson comments that Browne himself was not ignorant of
the "uselessness of all these enquiries” and “therefore, concludes
[his enquiries] with an observation which can never be too
frequently recollected."83 This observation which can “never be
too frequently recollected," a two-paragraph passage quoted by
Johnson, has to do with the contrast between pagan and
Christian hope, a contrast which Browne amplifies by using
personification to magnify the vanity of stoic-like unredemptive
hope. In the first paragraph, Browne depicts Socrates’s defiance
towards the “cold potion" of death and Cato’s similar defiance
towards the “fatal stroke"; in the second, he evaluates such
stoicism with a moving figure of personification (a favorite
figure of the Rambler):
It is the heaviest stone that melancholy can throw at a
man, to tell him he is at the end of his nature; or that

80
81
82
83

U/ori; of Brouine, I: 148
U/ori; of Thomai Browne, [. 155
Life of Browne, 20.
Life of Browne, 20.
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there is no further state to come, unto which this seems
progressional, and otherwise in vain.84
Such melancholy, we know, was a life-long thorn in Johnson’s
side. And what probably moved Johnson when reading this
passage was his knowledge that Browne, too, suffered from
religious skepticism. For in another passage in the "life” of
Browne, Johnson states that during his own "irruptions of
skepticism” he remembers Browne’s "method” for religious
victory, figuratively stated in Religio Medici:
If there arise any doubts in my way, I do forget them;
or at least defer them, till my better settled judgment
and more manly reason be able to resolve them: for I
perceive, every man’s reason is his best OEDIPUS, and will,
upon a reasonable truce, find a way to loose those bonds,
wherewith the subtilties of error have enchained our
more flexible and tender judgments.85

Interestingly enough, Johnson’s memory turns to this Brownean extended metaphor about rational insight to move him to
act upon the commonplace ethical principle of “conscience as
victor,” a mainstay of contemporary Christian ethics even
given epistemological elaboration by Locke himself in the
Essay's "Of Power.” While it has been persuasively argued in
the Johnsonian scholarship that Johnson was influenced by
Locke’s ethical theory of volition,86 it is noteworthy that in
moments of skepticism he benefitted from a writer’s copious
transfiguration of the cedipus myth as a reminder of Anglican
Christian principles, not just from Lockean logical appeals to
suspend judgment until reason curbs the passions. Johnson,
whose appetite for the tragic is well known, committed this
Brownean extended metaphor on escaping the bondage of
skepticism to memory.
While I have argued in this essay for a number of disconti
nuities in the Johnsonian and Lockean philosophies of style, it
is not my intention to belittle the abundant evidence that
Locke’s model of cognition stands firm in the Johnsonian

84 Life of Browne, 21.
85 Life of Browne, 44-5.
86 See Claudia L. Johnson, “Samuel Johnson’s Moral Psychology and Locke’s ‘Of
Power’,” Studies m English Literature 1500-1900 24 (1984): 563-82.
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corpus. Nor would [ disagree that Johnson shared a number
of Locke's educational, ethical, and religious viewpoints. Yet
regarding style, Johnson's and Locke’s divergence on stylistic
copia, particularly the value of the figures, has significant
consequences for their respective stances on learning and on
civic matters. What is surprising, in other words, is not the
simple fact of Johnson's disagreement with Locke, but rather
what is at issue in this disagreement: for acquiring, transmit
ting, recording and, ultimately, for using knowledge. Contrary
to the Lockean model of communication, Johnson believes that
the resources of stylistic copia undergird the advancement of all
kinds of knowledge, scientific, literary, civic, and religious; and
that it does so precisely through the epistemological venue,
observation, which Locke denies the tradition.
Yet my preceding arguments show but a part of the picture.
The other part, of course, is Johnson’s own use of the figures.
What role does figurative copia have in Johnson’s ethical and
political thought? And what themes are better enunciated
because of his love of the horn of plenty? These stylistic
matters, I think, are worthy of further inquiry.

